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Abstract
Unequal treaties and its theory have long been inhumed by the evolution of 
modern international law and reciprocity has become the principle in the quest of 
balancing rights and obligations of States party to a bilateral agreement. Despite 
this accepted configuration, a particular type of now expanding agreement – 
the bilateral investment treaty –, has sometimes been criticised in reason of the 
disequilibrium which mark its substance. Some of these agreements may, at first 
sight, raise the equality conundrum; others have been denounced for similar 
reasons. By excavating the buried and perhaps forgotten theory of unequal 
treaties, this article explains the normality of the disequilibrium and inequality 
characterising some international agreements and legal practices, and does this 
through the lenses of bilateral investment treaties used as an illustration. 
Keywords: Unequal treaties. Theory. Bilateral investment treaties. Disequilibrium.
Resumo
Tratados desiguais junto com a sua teoria têm sido enterrados e esquecidos 
pela evolução do direito internacional moderno, e a reciprocidade tornou-se o 
princípio, com o objetivo de encontrar um equilíbrio entre direitos e obrigações 
dos Estados assinatórios de um tratado bilateral. Embora a existência dessa 
configuração, um novo tipo de tratado – os tratados bilaterais sobre a proteção 
dos investimentos –, tem sido criticado em razão da sua falta de desequilíbrio. 
Alguns destes justamente apontam a problemática da igualdade; outros foram 
denunciados pela mesma razão. Ao escavar a teoria dos tratados desiguais, este 
artigo afirma a normalidae do desequilíbrio e da disigualdade que caraterizam 
alguns acordos internacionais e a prática dela decorrente; assim sendo, utiliza-se 
o exemplo dos tratados bilaterais sobre os investimentos a título de exemplo.
palavras chaves: Tratados desiguais. Teoria. Tratados bilaterais sobre os 
investimentos. Desequilíbrio.
1 Introduction
It would be a truism to note the unequal aspects of international relations. 
States have various levels of economic power which determine their political 
influence: the latter marks their position on the international scene. The law, as 
for it, aims at polishing these differences by creating a legal equality between 
States. This is, for example, what is provided for by the United Nations Charter’s 
preamble and by its articles 1(2), 2(1) and 551 on sovereign equality. The principle 
of equality has a reversed logic: it erases in theory the factual inequality which 
1 See: The United Nations Charter, available on: http://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/
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practically exists2. It is dressed with a psychological 
peel as it enables to tolerate and support the other types 
of inequality3. Equality between States means similar 
rights, similar duties and similar treatment4. States are 
equal legal subjects taken for granted that international 
law grants them with a similar level of protection while 
crediting them with the same duties5. For some authors 
this “forensic equality” must not even be proved: it is 
obvious6.  Despite the inequality of States in terms of 
size, of population, of power or wealth, they remain 
equal international legal entities7. This being said, there 
is often a direct relationship between States’ power and 
the process of creation of international law – and of its 
enforcement afterwards8. Consequently, and as asserted 
by Kelsen, this legal equality is merely theoretical. It 
constitutes the expression of the principle of a legal 
theory and not – intrinsically –, of the substance of law. 
And, it is the latter which is normally most relevant to 
interpret the principle of States’ equality. Equality of 
States is construed as implying equality of their rights, 
and it cannot be supported that States always have 
the same rights and the same obligations: this would 
obviously be contrary to the legal reality9. 
Still, under this configuration, modern international 
agreements are not tantamount to unequal treaties. 
Unequal treaties are those which are imposed upon 
States by other States using military, political or 
economical force, and which are not grounded on the 
2 SCHINDLER Dietrich. Contribution à l’étude des facteurs 
sociologiques et psychologiques du droit international. R.C.A.D.I., 
ano 4, v. 46, p. 261.
3 Ibid., p.263.
4 SCOTT, James Brown. Le principe de l’égalité juridique dans 
les rapports internationaux. R.C.A.D.I., ano 4, v. 42, p. 477.
5 PREUSS, Ulrich K. Equality of  States-Its Meaning in a 
Constitutionalized Global Order. Chicago Journal of  International 
Law, v. 9, p. 18, 2008-2009; VAN, Wynen thomas Ann. THOMAS 
JUNIOR, A. J. Equality of  States in International Law: Fact or 
Fiction? Virginia Law Review, v. 37, n. 6, p. 801-802, oct. 1951
6 MCNAIR, Arnold D. Equality in International Law. Michigan 
Law Review, v. 36, n. 2, p. 136, déc. 1927.
7 OPPENHEIM, Lassa. International Law: a treaties. 3. ed. 
Londres: Ronald F. Roxburg, 2008. p. 196.
8 SCHINDLER, Dietrich. op. cit., p.262.; VAN, Wynen 
Thomas Ann, THOMAS JUNIOR, A. J. op. cit., p. 802.
9 KELSEN, Hans. Théorie générale du droit international 
public: problèmes choisis. R.C.A.D.I., ano 4, v. 42, p. 190, 1932; see 
also: GILBERT, Guillaume. Droits et devoirs des nations: la théorie 
classique des droits fondamentaux des Etats. R.C.A.D.I., ano 5, 
v. 10, p. 593-597, 1925; VERDROSS, Alfred. Règles générales du 
droit international de la paix. R.C.A.D.I., ano 5, v. 30, p. 415, 1929; 
SCHINDLER, Dietrich. op. cit., p. 262.
principle of reciprocity; the rights and duties of the 
parties are, therein, not reciprocal10. The old, long-
buried theory of unequal treaties is here mentioned 
and excavated for the purpose of analysing one specific 
conundrum  — at least, sometimes considered as such 
by some —, of international investment law: the so-
called imbalanced nature of bilateral investment treaties. 
Bilateral treaties are signed between States to offer 
reciprocal protection to their investors. Some States – 
especially Latin American ones11 – have been criticising 
the general system of international investment law and 
their flanked bilateral investment agreements for being 
flawed with an inherent disequilibrium. The system is 
often considered as imbalanced in favour of foreign 
investors. Bilateral investment treaties which are signed 
between States to protect and to promote international 
investments provide an arsenal of rights to foreign 
investors without providing for equivalent obligations. 
An investor can claim rights by invoking the provisions 
of an investment agreement but he cannot be held 
liable for any obligation under the same treaty. 
Conversely, States have an obligation to protect foreign 
investors as per the investment-related agreements they 
have ratified, but they cannot expect any reciprocal 
obligation from them. In a nutshell therefore, investors 
have mostly rights and no obligations towards States 
which have, on their side, mostly obligations but no 
equivalent rights in their relation with investors. For 
part of the doctrine, international investment law 
is a monster of power aiming only at the protection 
of investors and their investments, ignoring in this 
process the other interests implied by presence of other 
actors12. Politically, the President of Ecuador, Raphael 
Correa has, for example, explained the necessity of 
10 DETTER, Ingrid. The Problem of  Unequal Treaties. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, v. 15, p. 1073, 1966; 
GROTIUS, Hugo. Le droit de la guerre et de la paix. Trad. Jean 
Barbeyrac. Amsterdam: Pierre de Coup. p. 546, t. 1. cap. 15; 
PETERS, Anne. Unequal treaties: the max planck encyclopedia of  
public international law. Oxford University Press, 2011. Available 
on: <www.mpepil.com>. p.8.
11 GAILLARD, Emmanuel. Anti-Arbitration Trends in Latin 
America. New York Law Journal, v. 239, n. 108, 2008; GARCIA-
BOLIVAR, Omar E. The surge of  investment disputes: Latin 
America testing the international law of  foreign investments. In: 
GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE ASIAN SOCIETY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2., 2009, Tokyo. Proceeding… Tokyo. 2009. 
p. 4-6; FACH, Katia Gomez. Latin America and ICSID: David versus 
Goliath. Law and Business Review of  the Americas, v. 17, p. 195-230, 2011.
12 SORNARAJAH, Muthucumaraswamy. The Settlement of  Foreign 
Investment Disputes. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000. p. 9.
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denouncing the Washington Convention13 instituting 
the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes by affirming with sheer virulence 
that this initiative implied freedom of States from 
ICSID which symbolises colonialism, enslavement 
by multinational companies, by Washington and 
by the World Bank14.  He also – wrongly – affirmed 
that developing countries always lost against private 
companies in international arbitration proceedings15. 
There is the idea that States, namely developing ones, 
are the pariahs with no real rights in an imbalanced 
international investment law system16. They have no 
legal title to claim and therefore no interest to start any 
action before an arbitral tribunal17. 
Initially, such investment agreements were derived 
from treaty models of developed States which proposed 
them to their partners – the developing States –, and 
they were signed without any thorough negotiation 
process18. These were often agreements between newly 
decolonised States and ancient colonial States. Many of 
these agreements are still in force and there are very 
few treaty models from developing States. There is an 
ongoing movement in Latin America with, for example, 
the Colombian bilateral investment treaty model of 
200719, but the process is far from being completed 
as confirmed, for example, by the American refusal in 
2006 to consider a Bolivian proposition on an equitable 
13 The Convention is available on: http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc_en-archive/ICSID_English.pdf
14 See: Investment Treaty News, Jun 2009, p. 3. Available on: 
<www.investmenttreatynews.org>.
15 FRANCK, Suzanne. Development and outcome of  
investment treaty arbitration. Harvard International Law Journal, v. 50, 
n. 2, p. 202, 2009.
16 HELLIO, Hugues. L’Etat, un justiciable de second ordre? 
A propos des demandes étatiques dans le contentieux arbitral 
transnational relatif  aux investissements étrangers. RGDIP, ano 
113, n. 3, p. 598, 2009; See also: Le système actuel est-il déséquilibré 
en faveur de l’investisseur privé étranger et au détriment de l’Etat 
d’accueil (Table ronde), In: LEBEN, Charles. (Org.). Le contentieux 
arbitral transnational relatif  à l’investissement. Nouveaux développement. 
Paris: LGDJ, Anthémis, 2006. p. 185-202; EL BOUDOUHI, 
Saïda. L’intérêt général et les règles substantielles de protection des 
investissements. AFDI, p. 542, 2005.
17 HELLIO, op. cit., p. 598.
18 JUILLARD, Patrick. Le système actuel est-il déséquilibré 
en faveur de l’investisseur privé étranger et au détriment de 
l’Etat d’accueil? (Table Ronde). In: LEBEN, Charles (Org.). Le 
contentieux arbitral transnational relatif  à l’investissement: Nouveaux 
Développements. Paris: L.G.D.J., 2006. p.191.
19 The Colombian treaty model is available on: http://italaw.
com/documents/inv_model_bit_colombia.pdf
trade agreement between the two States20. Developing 
States have a very relative capacity to negotiate with 
industrialised ones and they cannot easily impose their 
conditions during negotiations. This is surely one of 
the reasons why bilateral investment treaties do not 
normally refer in an extensive mode to the interests of 
developing countries21. However, the question of the 
political and economical force is not the only reason 
for this. The agreements between developing States 
are in turn not always really negotiated, and contain 
very few provisions valuing their interests. It is often an 
existing model of a developed State which will be used 
by a developing State in its economic relationship with 
other developing States22; at least, various agreements 
between developing States have followed this path. 
This is sometimes due to a lack of expertise and 
technical know-know23 – and is also perhaps related to 
a fashion trend whereby each State must have its own 
constellation of agreements. Exceptions exist. Many 
bilateral investment treaties of Singapore, for example, 
are not mere reproductions of existing European 
treaty models24.  Standing as an exception in the field, 
Brazil has, for the moment, not ratified any bilateral 
investment treaty – without hindering the flows of 
investments towards its territory25.   
There is surely a disequilibrium in treaty negotiations 
but this pertains to the cold reality of international 
relations which are characterised by their unequal 
20 FACH, Katia Gomez. op. cit., p. 216-221; VIS-DUNBAR 
Damon. Analysis: Latin America’s new model bilateral investment 
treaties. Investment Treaty News, 17 jul. 2008. Available at: <http://
www.iisd.org/itn/2008/07/17/in-depth-latin-america-s-new-
model-bilateral-investment-treaties/>.
21 ALEXANDER, Emily. A.  Taking Account of  Reality: 
Adopting Contextual Standards for Developing Countries in 
International Investment Law. Virginia Journal of  International Law, v. 
48, p. 823-824, 2008.
22 MALIK, Manaz. South-South Bilateral Investment Treaties: 
the same old story? In: FORUM FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRY 
INVESTMENT NEGOTIATORS BACKGROUND PAPERS 
NEW DELHI, 4., 2010. Anais… 2010. In: THE INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 2011, p.1-5. 
Available on: <http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/dci_2010_south_
bits.pdf>. p. 1-5; VANDEVELDE, Kenneth. J. a brief  history of  
International  Investment Agreements. University of  California Davis 
Journal of  International Law and Policy, v. 12, p. 170, 2005.
23 MALIK, op. cit., p. 1-5.
24 Ibid.
25 See: WHITSITT, Elizabeth. VIS-DUNBAR, Damon. 
Investment Arbitration in Brazil: yes or no?. Investment Treaty News, 
30 nov. 2008. Available on: <http://www.iisd.org/itn/2008/11/30/
investment-arbitration-in-brazil-yes-or-no/>
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nature. If this has an effect on the creation of law, it 
does not necessarily means that the law produced is 
in itself imbalanced. And even if it were, the problem 
might not be purely legal; it might simply be a moral 
appreciation without any serious effects on the legal 
structure. Through the lenses of the theory of unequal 
treaties which must here be excavated and developed 
for being an old, nearly fossilised concept (I), it can 
be affirmed and confirmed that the latter does not 
apply to investment agreements – despite the latter’s 
appearance (II).
1.1 Excavating The Theory of Unequal Treaties
Studying this theory starts by an analysis of the legal 
status of unequal treaties (A) before understanding the 
reasons grounding their former existence (B).
(A) The Legal Status of Unequal Treaties
The inequality characterising an unequal treaty 
rests on the imbalanced promises which it contains 
whereby one party is made inferior to the other26. 
The inexistence of reciprocity is here a critical and 
determining factor27: the inter-State relationship 
favours one of the parties in an unreasonable manner28; 
the interests of one party are valued, those of the 
other are ignored29. The inequality is substantial and 
procedural. It is substantial as the obligations of the 
parties are not symmetrical, and it can be procedural 
if the treaty has been concluded by the means of force 
and violence, flawing subsequently one of the parties’ 
consent30. Many treaties concluded by European States 
with indigenous peoples of conquered territories 
during the colonisation periods between the 16th and 
the 17th century have been considered as substantially 
and procedurally unequal31. The most famous unequal 
treaties are certainly the Chinese ones32. More than 
26 WANG, Tieya. International law in China: historical and 
contemporary perspectives. R.C.A.D.I., ano 2, v. 221, p. 334, 1990.
27 PETERS, op. cit., p.8.
28 GROTIUS,  op. cit., p. 546.
29 DETTER, op. cit., p. 1073.
30 PETERS, op. cit., p. 2.
31 PETERS, op. cit., p. 3.
32 CRAVEN, Matthew. What happened to unequal treaties? the 
continuities of  informal empire. Nordic Journal of  International Law, v. 
74, p. 343, 2005; FINKELSTEIN, Jesse. A. An examination of  the 
treaties governing the far-eastern sino-soviet border in light of  the 
a thousand treaties signed by China with eighteen 
States between 1842 and 1949 have been construed 
as unequal33. Some of these States were, for example, 
the United-States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, 
France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, 
Spain, Portugal, Peru and Brazil34. These treaties had 
an extraterritorial object35. The well-known treaty of 
Nanking imposed by the United Kingdom on the 29th 
August 1842 is one of these36. By the application of the 
extraterritoriality principle, the nationals of one State 
cannot be submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign 
State in which he is, or in which he has established 
business. In China, for example, foreigners under this 
regime were not under the empire of Chinese law but 
under the jurisdiction of their own national law37. This 
extraterritoriality was obviously not reciprocal; Chinese 
citizens did not have this privilege abroad.  An author 
described and justified this unequal relationship as 
such – and the quote, although extensive, is telling and 
informative:
 The very necessity of things requires . . . that certain 
States should not be called to enjoy international rights 
in an integral fashion as with perfect equality. So it is 
reasonable that the States of Europe should not admit 
perfect equality with Turkey and its dependencies; with 
the States of Africa, with the exception of Liberia and 
the English and French colonies; with the States of 
Asia, with the exception of Siberia and Hindostan. .. . 
we may lay down the following rules:
unequal treaties doctrine. Boston College of  International and Comparative 
Law Review, v. 2, n. 2, p. 455-460, 1979; GREENBERG, Katherine.A. 
Hong Kong’s future: Can the People’s Republic of  China Invalidade 
the Treaty of  Nanking As an Unequal Treaty? Fordham International 
Law Journal, v. 7, p. 544-548, 1984; KU, Charlotte. Abolition of  
China’s unequal treaties and the search for regional stability in Asia, 
1919-1943. Chinese/Taiwan Yearbook of  International Law and Affairs, 
v. 12, p. 67-86, 1992-1994; NOZARI, Fariborz. Unequal Treaties in 
International Law. Stockholm: S-Bryan Sundt, 1971. p.201.
33 PETERS, op. cit., p. 3. 
34 WANG, op. cit., p. 241; WOOLSEY, L.H. [intervention]. The 
Termination of  unequal treaties. American Society of  International Law 
Proceedings, v. 21, p. 96, 1927.
35 CRAVEN, op. cit., p. 34; DETTER, op. cit., p. 1075; SCOTT, 
Shirley V. The Problem of  unequal treaties in contemporary 
international law: how the powerful have reneged on the political 
compacts within which five cornerstone treaties of  global 
governance are situated. Journal of  International Law and International 
Relations, v. 4, n. 2, p.105, 2008.
36 WANG, op. cit., p. 237. See pages 252-253 for a list of  matters 
present in Chines Treaties.
37 NOZARI, op. cit., p. 159; PETERS, op. cit., p. 4.
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(a) Full and entire juridical equality ought to be 
limited to those States among which there have been 
developed the fundamental juridical ideas essential to 
the co-existence of States in society.
(b) A State which does not find itself in a position 
to fulfil its international duties towards other States, 
either as a result of traditional prejudices, of its internal 
organization, or its customs and its religious beliefs, can 
only demand the full enjoyment of international rights in 
perfect equality on condition that it change its internal 
organization so as to enable it to fulfil its international 
duties by giving substantial guarantees on this subject...
(c) As long as such reforms are not carried out within 
those States, other States which have relations with 
them ought to observe the stipulations of treaties.38
The theory of unequal treaties has not always been 
recognised by the majority of the doctrine in international 
law, especially the European one39. Contextually, this is 
normal. The European States were the ‘superior’ and 
dominant parties to these agreements and the European 
doctrine of this epoch and even of more recent times 
considered this legal configuration as something 
obeying to the utmost normality. And utmost normality 
is never questioned. Logically, in the opposite sense, 
the doctrinal approach of States suffering from these 
treaties was different and they were qualified as unequal 
and humiliating40. It is in great part the Chinese and 
Russian authors who have forged the theory of unequal 
treaties41.  For the Russian doctrine, the majority of 
treaties emanating from States following a capitalist and 
market-based economy was unequal especially when 
concluded with developing States. They were means 
to enslave powerless States42. Hence, treaties having for 
principal object military bases on foreign territories or 
those concerning economical and technical assistance 
between States, those providing for credits and loans were 
38 FIORE, Pasquale. Diritto internazionale. Torino: 1904. p. 291, 
quoted by: DETTER, op. cit., p. 1076.
39 DAILLIER, Patrick; PELLET, Alain. Droit International Public. 
7. ed. Paris: L.G.D.J., 2002, p. 201; PETERS, op. cit., p. 7;  WANG, 
op. cit. p. 335.
40 WANG, op. cit., p. 334-335; PETERS, op. cit., p. 7.
41 PETERS, op. cit., p. 7.
42 KRYLOV, Serge. La notion principale du droit des gens: la 
doctrine soviétique du droit international. R.C.A.D.I., ano 1, v. 70, 
p. 434, 1947.
considered as unequal and void43. For this doctrine, the 
unique imbalance of power of the signatories invalidates 
the agreement. The inequality of the parties colours the 
agreements they sign and this kills their legal value and 
existence44. This was also the position of many newly 
decolonised States45. The African-Asian Conference, 
having met for the first time in Bandung in 195546, 
voted a resolution on unequal treaties in 1957 defining 
them, therein, as openly imbalanced treaties imposed by 
the powerful States on the powerless ones47. One draft 
constitution of the Popular Republic of China affirmed 
the will of the Chinese people to denounce, renegotiate 
or revise the treaties signed by the Empire so as to abolish 
all the privileges of the foreign powers48.  China, in fact, 
undertook various initiatives to denounce these treaties49. 
From the stance of those who bore these agreements, 
domination and humiliation were the leitmotifs. There are 
various other reasons explaining unequal treaties.
(B)  The reasons behind unequal treaties.
Two main series of reasons ground the logic of 
unequal treaties. The first one has a civilisational 
character, the second, an economical one.  Firstly, 
the civilisational reason is related to the difference in 
the legal culture and in the general culture of States. 
In this sense, the Chinese law was not of immediate 
access and understanding to Europeans because of 
the language barrier and also because the principles, 
rules and customs differed utterly50. In Imperial China, 
43 LUKASHUK, I. The Soviet Union and international treaties. 
Soviet Yearbook of  International Law, 1959, p.16-50; TALALEV, A; 
BOYARSHINOV, V.G. Unequal Treaties as a Mode of  Prolonging the 
Colonial Dependence of  the New States of  Asia and Africa. Soviet Yearbook 
of  International Law, p. 156-170, 1961. These texts being in Russian, the 
arguments made by their authors have been taken from: PETERS, op. 
cit., p. 7. See also: DETTER, Ingrid. The Problem of  Unequal Treaties. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, v. 15, p. 1082, 1966.
44 FINKELSTEIN, Jesse. A. An examination of  the treaties 
governing the far-eastern sino-soviet border in light of  the unequal 
treaties doctrine. Boston College of  International and Comparative Law 
Review, v. 2, n. 2, p. 452-461, 1979.
45 SINHA, Prakash. Perspective of  the Newly Independent 
States on the Binding Quality of  International Law. International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, v. 14, p. 124, 1965.
46 For a summary of  the conference, see: VARELLA, Marcelo 
Dias. Direito internacional econômico ambiental. Belo Horizonte: Del Rey, 
2003. p. 10-11.
47 WANG, op. cit., p. 336.
48 WANG, op. cit., p. 337.
49 WANG, op. cit., p.260.
50 DETTER, op. cit., p. 1078.
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law had a relative value and there was a reign of a 
Confucian conception of the social structure whereby 
non-legal rules of behaviour which the citizens 
imposed to themselves to regulate their social life were 
more important and were therefore given priority over 
the sovereign rules. The legal culture as it existed in 
Europe at that time was inexistent in China51. The 
principle of the separation of powers, dear to many 
European States, did not have roots in China52.  In 
another region, the Ottoman Empire had also signed 
capitulation treaties with Western European States or 
with the United States. The inequality here was not, 
as a matter of fact, related to the element of power, 
the Empire being itself a dominant one under the rule 
of the sultans. The Empire’s territory was under the 
jurisdiction of islamic law which did not apply to non-
muslims. As a result, treaties passed with the sultans 
enabled non-muslim foreigners to remain under the 
jurisdiction of their State of nationality on the Empire’s 
territory; here, there was not a real subordination53. 
These were some factors which justified, initially, the 
will to establish such conventional relationship qualified 
as unequal.  However, and this is the second reason, a 
mercantile objective also lurked behind these treaties. 
The United States, for example, wanted to maintain 
its extraterritorial rights on the Moroccan soil at any 
cost even when the latter State fell under the French 
protectorate regime, and therefore under French law54. 
The same trade-oriented will applied in the Chinese 
case. The interests of the independent States of that 
era in building and maintaining a relationship with 
China were, of course, commercial ones. The aim of 
the treaties they imposed was to open the Chinese 
market and to exploit the Chinese production. It is this 
political and economical conjunction which lead China 
– unfavourable to any foreign presence on its territory 
–, to the two Opium wars in 1839 and 1857 respectively. 
These wars resulted in the above-mentioned Treaty of 
Nanking with the United Kingdom in 1842 and in 
that of Tientsin with the United Kingdom, France and 
51 LEGEAIS, Raymond. Grands systèmes de droit contemporains: 
approche comparative. Paris: Litec, 2008. p. 218-224.
52 DETTER, op. cit., p. 1078.
53 DETTER, op. cit. p. 1077; NOLDE, Boris. Droits et 
techniques des traités de commerce. R.C.A.D.I., ano 2, v. 3, p. 
304; NOZARI, Fariborz. Unequal treaties in international law. 
Stockholm: S-Bryan Sundt, 1971. p. 161-162; STRISOWER, Leo. 
L’extraterritorialité et ses principales applications. R.C.A.D.I., ano 1, 
v. 1, p. 234, 1923.
54 DETTER, op. cit., p.1081.
the United-States in 185855. The first one provided for 
an extraterritorial regime for British citizens in China 
whilst the second legalised the trade of of opium with 
special tariffs.  It is namely after the conclusion of 
these treaties that China suffered from the imposition 
of other unequal treaties by other States56. The effects 
of these treaties were worsened by the existence in 
their provisions of a most-favoured nation clause. 
The advantage or privilege offered to a State had to 
be extended to the others57 and this deepened the 
disequilibrium of the relations with China.
This being said, modern international law does 
not, as such, prohibit these types of treaties containing 
rights and duties with no or with relative reciprocity58. 
According to Judge Simma, reciprocity is the status of 
a relationship between two or more States whereby the 
behaviour of one party is in one way or the other legally 
dependent on the other party’s posture59. It constitutes, 
nowadays, the pillar of a conventional relationship and 
contrarily to most ancient treaties60, it does not have 
to be mentioned and highlighted in the agreements’ 
body. Reciprocity is normality: it is the principle. The 
rights and obligations of the parties have a reflective 
effect even if the mirror can have a deformity, thereby 
attributing more rights or obligations to one party or 
to the other. As per the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (1969), a treaty is void only if it has 
been concluded by the use of force or by threat61, by 
error, by fraud62, by corruption63 or coercion of the 
State’s representative64. An imbalanced treaty between 
sovereign States is not void and invalid if it has been 
concluded in conformity with the Vienna Convention. 
This however does not mean that a disequilibrium 
55 NOZARI, op. cit., p. 201-211; WANG, op. cit., p. 237-253.
56 NOZARI, op. cit., p. 201-202.
57 CRAVEN, op. cit., p. 343-344; PETERS, op. cit., p.4.
58 PAULUS, Andreas. Reciprocity revisited. In: FASTENRATH 
et al. From Bilateralism to Community Interest: essays in honour of  
Judge Bruno Simma. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. p. 
119; SIMMA, Buno. Recriprocity: the max planck encyclopedia of  
public international law. Oxford University Press, 2008. Available 
on: <www.mpepil.com> . p.4.
59 SIMMA, op. cit., p. 2.
60 See: NOLDE Boris. Droits et techniques des traités de 
commerce. R.C.A.D.I.,  ano 2, v. 3, p. 320-321, 1924.
61 See article 52 of  the Vienna Convention on the Law of  
Treaties, available on: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf
62 See article 49 of  the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties.
63 See article 50 of  the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties.
64 See article 51 of  the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties.
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characterising an agreement does not give rise to 
any practical problem. The latter can be of a political 
character but it obeys to a legal concretisation in the 
case of a treaty denunciation, for example, – and it is 
not useless to pay attention to the reasons underscoring 
treaty denunciation. The denunciation of bilateral 
investment treaties by Venezuela or by Ecuador and 
the will of some States, often developing ones, to end 
the investment-related agreements by which they are 
linked is justified by the disequilibrium inherent to 
their conventional relationship with industrialised 
States65. If these agreements are legally founded and 
valid, they have become unacceptable for some. The 
aim here is not to affirm that bilateral investment 
treaties are by definition always unequal and that 
this is condemnable or must be condemned, but to 
understand what legal consequences are attached to an 
eventual disequilibrium.
II. Upholding the Relativity of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties as Unequal Treaties 
Understanding the overall equilibrium of bilateral 
investment treaties (A) enables to affirm that they do not 
pertain to the category of unequal treaties when studied 
through the lenses of the unequal treaties theory (B).
A) Understanding The Overall Equilibrium of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Firstly, the procedural equilibrium of the bilateral 
treaties has to be examined (i); secondly, the study has 
to focus on the material provisions of these treaties in 
order to see if they unreasonably favour one party more 
than the other and if, in so doing, the latter finds itself 
in a position of subordination, forcefully at the mercy 
of his economic partner (ii).
65 FACH, op. cit., p. 216-221; MACHADO, Decio. Ecuador y la 
denuncia de los Tratados Bilaterales de Inversión. CATDM, 7 dec. 
2009. Available at:< http://www.cadtm.org/Ecuador-y-la-denuncia-
de-los>; VAN, Harten Gus. Five Justifications for Investment 
Treaties: A Critical Discussion. Trade, Law and Development, v. 2, n. 1, 
2010. Available at: <http://www.tradelawdevelopment.com/index.
php/tld/article/view/2(1)%20TL%26D%2019%20(2010)/38>; 
VIS-DUNBAR, Damon. Analysis: Latin America’s new model 
bilateral investment treaties. Investment Treaty News, 17 jul. 2008. 
Available on: <http://www.iisd.org/itn/2008/07/17/in-depth-
latin-america-s-new-model-bilateral-investment-treaties/>.
(i) The question of the procedural inequality of 
bilateral investment treaties.
On a procedural level, the existence of a 
disequilibrium is often decried in that the investors 
are always the claimants before arbitral tribunals 
and that the States are always the defendants even 
if the arbitration rules enables them to produce 
counterclaims66. There is no reciprocity in the 
capacity of asking for the constitution of an arbitral 
tribunal67. The investor finds himself in a monopoly 
position enabling him to trigger the arbitral procedure 
following his will68. Consequently, a State cannot sue an 
investor in international investment arbitration. This 
situation had already been noticed before the Iran-US 
claims tribunal in a case of the 21st December 1981 
concerning the tribunal’s competence following Iran’s 
claims against nationals of the United-States69. On the 
basis of the Algiers declarations, Iran asked the tribunal 
to declare its competence to receive its claims against 
American companies. According to article II of the 
Declaration on the settlement of claims, the tribunal is 
competent for cases implying the claims of American 
citizens against Iran or for the claims of Iranian citizens 
agains the United-States. At the same time, the tribunal 
is competent for any contractual dispute between Iran 
and the United-States70. Iran argued that it was founded 
66 See : article 46 of  The Washington Convention instituting 
ICSID and article 40 of  the Arbitration Rules; WALDE Thomas. 
Procedural Challenge in Investment Arbitration Under the Shadow 
of  the Dual role of  States. Asymmetries and Tribunals’ Duty to 
Encure Pro-Actively, the Equality of  Arms. Arbitration International, 
vol.26, no.1, 2010, pp.15-16.
67 BEN, Hamida Walid. Le système actuel est-il déséquilibré 
en faveur de l’investisseur privé étranger et au détriment de l’Etat 
d’accueil? (Table Ronde). In: LEBEN, Charles (Org.). Le contentieux 
arbitral transnational relatif  à l’investissement. Nouveaux Développements. 
Paris: L.G.D.J., 2006. p.200.
68 SORNARAJAH, Muthucumaraswamy. Power and Justice: 
Third World Resistence in International Law. Singapore Yearbook of  
International Law, v. 10, p. 32, 2006.
69 Case related to the tribunal’s competence following Iranian 
claims against American citizens, award, 21 December 1981 
(signed on the 13th January 1982), Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 
International Legal Materials, vol.21, 1982, pp.78-91.  For a 
commentary of  the award, see, voir: STERN (B.), A propos 
d’une sentence d’un Tribunal des différends irano-américain, 
Annuaire française de droit international, v. 28, p. 425-453, 1982.
70 Case related to the tribunal’s competence following 
Iranian claims against American citizens, award, 21 December 
1981 (signed on the 13th January 1982), Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal, International Legal Materials, v. 21, p. 80, 1982.
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to submit a claim against American companies. The 
tribunal rejected the claim and explained that if Iran 
could submit a counterclaim against American citizens 
– which supposed that the latter had already started 
legal proceedings –, no interpretation could imply that 
the parties had initially provided for the triggering of 
the procedure by a State against a national71.  Hence, in 
the relationship between private person and State, the 
initiative of action rested in the former’s hands. This 
award was rendered with three dissenting opinions. 
The dissenting arbitrators underlined the absence 
of consideration of the reciprocity principle by the 
tribunal. They affirmed that the Algiers Declarations 
were built on this principle which is the ratio of mutual 
obligations between the States72. In their opinion, the 
Declarations must not be interpreted in a way to benefit 
only one of the parties so that the other’s claims be 
forever classified as procedurally inadmissible because 
if this was the case, the Declarations would lose their 
equilibrium and would be wither without a cause or 
with a superficial cause. The reasons on which they 
rest to support this position is contextual; the context 
is such that there is a higher probability that it is an 
American company which starts proceedings against 
Iran than an Iranian company against the United-
States. The tribunal, say the dissenting arbitrators, 
has not considered this context and this deprives the 
provision providing for Iranian claims against the 
United-States of any effectivity and leaves it with a 
mere poetical effect, they add73. In this situation where 
only American companies have the upper hand, these 
arbitrators do not understand why Iran has to bear half 
of the tribunal’s expenses. As for counterclaims, they 
argue that these are means of defence which can be 
used against a claimant for an action which has already 
started and that in any case, producing a counterclaim 
71 Case related to the tribunal’s competence following 
Iranian claims against American citizens, award, 21 December 
1981 (signed on the 13th January 1982), Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal, International Legal Materials, v. 21, p. 81-82, 1982.
72 Case related to the tribunal’s competence following 
Iranian claims against American citizens, award, 21 December 
1981 (signed on the 13th January 1982), Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal, International Legal Materials, v. 21, p. 85, 1982.
73 Case related to the tribunal’s competence following Iranian 
claims against American citizens, award, 21 December 1981 
(signed on the 13th January 1982), Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 
Dissenting Opinion of  arbitrators Kashani, Shafieie et Hossein 
Enayat,International Legal Materials, v. 21, p. 87, 1982.
is a right which is made available to any defendant74. 
Conceptually, the point on which they dissented was 
the absence of equilibrium between the parties which 
is prone to kill the reciprocity of any agreement. It 
is exactly on this background that investor-State 
arbitration is held in international investment law. 
Investors and States have pre-defined and pre-
established roles.
According to an author, this is normal as the private 
investor is himself in an unequal position, taken as a 
hostage, he claims, by the double function of the State 
which is on one hand, a contracting party and on the 
other, the public person with regulatory powers, with 
prérogatives de puissance publique75. There is perhaps 
an exaggerated reference to a hostage-like situation, 
especially when many multinational companies are 
sometimes more powerful than their State partners76. 
The author however adopts an interesting analogical 
approach. He compares the logic of international 
investment arbitration to administrative law or to other 
international legal procedure, like the one applicable 
before the European Court of Human Rights, whereby 
only the person having suffered a damage has the 
capacity to start a proceeding against a State which has 
promised to abide to certain obligations; any asymmetry 
is consequently implicit but at the same time, quite 
normal77 – and surely accepted. If it is an arbitration to 
assess the responsibility of the host State of an investor, 
the procedure is very close to a control of legality 
found in administrative law, especially the French one, 
and in this case, it is obvious that only one party can 
start the arbitration machinery78. The difference with 
74 Case related to the tribunal’s competence following Iranian 
claims against American citizens, award, 21 December 1981 
(signed on the 13th January 1982), Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 
Dissenting Opinion of  arbitrators Kashani, Shafieie et Hossein 
Enayat,International Legal Materials, v. 21,  p. 88, 1982.
75 WALDE, op.cit., p. 15-16.
76 See, MAUREL Olivier. La responsabilité des entreprises en 
matière de droits de l’homme. I. Nouveaux enjeux, nouveaux Rôles. 
Étude de la Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de 
l’Homme, Paris: La Documentation Française, 2009, pp.263-264: The 
study establishes the ranking of  the 100 richest States and multinational 
companies and it shows that the revenu of  these companies is superior 
to the gross national product of  many States; SORNARAJAH 
Muthucumaraswamy. The Settlement of  Foreign Investment Disputes. 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000, p.14.
77 WALDE, op. cit., p. 15-16.
78 BURDEAU, Geneviève. Le système actuel est-il déséquilibré 
en faveur de l’investisseur privé étranger et au détriment de l’Etat 
d’accueil? (Table Ronde). In: LEBEN, op. cit., p. 187.
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administrative law is that in investment arbitration, the 
claimant is always a foreign company. What is surely 
somehow disturbing for some and what eventually takes 
the form or the appearance of a disequilibrium is the 
image of the multinational company which ferociously 
distrusts the national tribunals of the host State and 
which prefers the jurisdiction of international arbitral 
tribunals. This situation of a dominant foreigner with 
such power against a State, especially when the latter is 
a developing one, gives birth to the mental image of the 
colonial usurper having a violent force of domination 
and enslavement on State’s sovereignty. Finally, it may 
be that the disequilibrium is only a question of image 
or of images’ association. Indeed, it is less disturbing 
and less questionable when a private person or 
company sues the State of which he is a national before 
an administrative tribunal of the municipal legal order. 
The same can be said as far as the European Court of 
Human Rights or the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights are concerned. For these reasons, assimilating 
bilateral investment treaties with unequal treaties can 
be tricky considering, moreover, that these treaties are 
not imposed by violence and are done in crystal-clear 
legality, in conformity with the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties79. It is mostly the extraneous 
character of the private foreign investor which gives 
rise to the question of inequality which must now 
be assessed following the substantial provisions of 
bilateral investment treaties. 
(ii) The Question of the Substantial Inequality of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties
These treaties are often criticised because of the 
numerous and important rights they confer to investors 
without providing for equivalent obligations80. Reading 
any bilateral investment treaty confirms the large 
extent of protection granted to investors, sometimes 
even overprotected by the application of the most-
favoured nation clause. It is very rare to see bilateral 
investment treaties containing any substantial provision 
79 See article 52 of  the Vienna Convention on the Law of  
Treaties, available on: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf
80 JUILLARD, op. cit., p. 190-191.; MUCHLINSKI, Peter. 
Corporate Social Responsibility. In: MUCHLINSKI Peter. et al. 
The Oxford Handbook of  International Investment Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008. p. 638; SORNARAJAH, Muthucumaraswamy. 
Power and Justice: Third World Resistence in International Law. 
Singapore Yearbook of  International Law, v. 10, p. 32, 2006.
on development objectives or other State interest 
for example.  As aforementioned, this is due to an 
inequality in the bargaining and negotiating power of 
States81.  This being said, the situation is a formalisation 
of a legal bilateralism as it is possible to clearly identify 
who has rights and obligations and by whom these 
can be enforced82. However, the effectivity of norms 
in bilateral agreements is guaranteed by the principle 
of reciprocity83, and it is in this sense that bilateral 
investment treaties are sometimes considered as 
practically unilateral. The relationship between private 
persons and States makes sense only if these actors 
accept and recognise each other mutually and if, at the 
same time, they acknowledge their respective interests. 
This is what must be understood by reciprocity which, 
as put by Professor Virally, is the soul of treaties84; 
outside this framework, the relationship is that of a 
master and a slave or that of a permanent state of war, 
he argues85. Bilateral treaties are not unilateral acts 
providing privileges to foreign traders against any form 
of violence as it was the case in Europe between the 
VIIIe and the XIIIe century86. This unilateral aspect 
of investment treaties must, nonetheless, be processed 
through relativity. 
The legal reciprocity of a bilateral investment treaty 
in fact means that the investors from both signatory 
States can invoke the treaties’ provisions against a 
reprehensible behaviour of the host State. On the 
basis of a bilateral investment treaty between the 
United Kingdom and Russia, a British investor can 
sue the Russian State if the latter infringes the treaty’s 
provisions and similarly,  a Russian investor vexed by 
the United Kingdom can ask for the constitution of an 
arbitral tribunal to seek damages. Both investors are 
protected in a similar fashion. Legally, the principle of 
reciprocity is not frustrated; it concerns the reciprocal 
actions of private investors from the States parties to 
the treaty rather than the States’ actions themselves. 
Again, some bitter relativity must be brought here, 
and this is related to the status of the States having 
signed the agreement. In his Hague lecture, Professor 
81 VIRALLY, Michel. Le principe de réciprocité dans le droit 
international contemporain. R.C.A.D.I., ano 3, v. 122, p. 66, 1967.
82 SIMMA, Bruno. From Bilateral to Community Interest in 
International Law. R.C.A.D.I., ano 4, v. 250, p. 232-233, 1994.
83  Ibid, p. 233.
84 VIRALLY, op. cit.,  p.6.
85 Ibid. p. 5.
86 See: NOLDE, op. cit., p. 299-305.
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Virally raised the question of the possibility of any 
reciprocity when one of the partners was a developing 
State87. The legal equality is not a factual equality. To 
continue with the same example, the United Kingdom 
is also a party to bilateral investment treaties signed 
with States like Haiti, Nepal, Burundi or Cameroon. 
The question here is of a practical and logical order. 
There are certainly more British investors in Nepal or 
Cameroon than Nepalese or Cameroonese investors in 
the United Kingdom. Thus, it is more probable that 
the treaty be really useful only to British investors. 
The economic disparity between the States frames 
the treaty to the only benefit and use of the investor 
from developed States as he only has sufficient means 
to undertake international investments. What has been 
said is far from being subversive and demagogical but 
is a mere description of reality. Despite the rise of the 
so-called BRICS, there are, for the time being, more 
investments circulation from developed States towards 
developing ones88. On these grounds, the bilateralism 
can be doubtful. Reciprocity exists in law and this 
cannot be denied. It however sometimes remains in 
its theoretical aspect and loses itself behind a factual 
inequality. But, in any case, any disequilibrium which 
might characterise investment treaties is, in reality, an 
accepted disequilibrium.
B) Affirming The Voluntary Disequilibrium Of 
Bilateral Investment Treaty.
From the precedent analysis, it is possible to conclude 
that bilateral investment treaties are theoretically equal 
but that some relativity must sometimes be injected, 
especially when it comes to the interaction between 
developing and developed States. Nevertheless, these 
agreements are not forcefully imposed on States as it 
was in the case of Imperial China. There is an obvious 
difference in the economic level and negotiation capacity 
of the States but bilateral investment treaties are always 
signed voluntarily89; even those States which denounce 
such treaties later on had initially consented as per the 
requirements of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. It is true that some States did not master the 
appropriate technical tools of international investment 
law and have signed such agreements without an iota 
87 VIRALLY, op. cit., p. 88-89.
88 JUILLARD, Patrick. L’évolution des sources du droit des 
investissements. R.C.A.D.I., ano 4, v. 250, p. 107, 1994.
89 BEN, op. cit., p. 201.
of knowledge of the future consequences. As Professor 
Juillard ironically stated, very often, the treaty models 
of developed States were just sent to the relevant 
ministry of developing States and a few days later, the 
treaties were sent back with the competent authority’s 
signature90. Other States engage in such agreements 
even if they are aware that their citizens will probably 
not invest abroad simply because they expect to derive 
some benefits in terms of an increase in the level of 
foreign investments or in terms of a consolidation of 
the political relationship with the other partner91. It is a 
sort of compromise of interests which do not, as such, 
pertain to the field of law. The United Nations Charter, 
for historical reasons, provides for the existence of five 
permanent members with a right of veto92.  If this is a 
form of inequality between States, many States accept 
it despite the gradual evaporation of the historical 
reasons. The question is not whether there is or not a 
voluntary servitude from some States; legally speaking, 
the signature and the ratification means consent and 
therefore, the State has to abide to its conventional 
engagement in good faith93 whether it is based on an 
equal or an unequal foundation, and whether it is or 
not reciprocal. The consequences have to be measured 
before the signature. The latter, once sealed, is 
submitted to pacta sund servanda94. If some States are 
no longer satisfied with such agreements, they have the 
possibility of denouncing them95 or of refusing their 
extension. This is an attribute of their sovereignty. 
They cannot be engaged without their will96, but once 
the consent has been given, it remains legally valid and 
binding.
90 JUILLARD, Patrick. Le système actuel est-il déséquilibré 
en faveur de l’investisseur privé étranger et au détriment de l’Etat 
d’accueil?  (Table Ronde). In: LEBEN, Charles. (Org.). Le contentieux 
arbitral transnational relatif  à l’investissement. op. cit., p.191.
91 PAULUS, op. cit., p.117.
92 See United Nations Charter, article 23, article 27, Available 
on: <http://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/>
93 See article 26 of  the Vienna Convention on the Law of  
Treaties.
94 See article 26 of  the Vienna Convention on the Law of  
Treaties; see also: Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgement, 20 
December 1974, I.C.J., ICJ Reports, 1974, p. 268, §46.
95 See article 56 of  the Vienna Convention on the Law of  
Treaties.
96 Case of  the S.S. Lotus (France c. Turkey), judgement, 7th 
September 1927, Permanent court of  International Justice, Series 
A., n. 10, p.18.
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